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FEDERALISM OR FEDERATIONISM

William E.

Butler*

FEDERALISM, DEMOCRATIZATION AND THE RULE OF LAW IN
RUSSIA. By Jeffrey Kahn. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2002.

Pp. xii, 319. $65.

When I took up my appointment in October 1970 as Reader in
Comparative Law in the University of London, I was invited to col
laborate in teaching the LL.M.' course in Soviet Law offered within the
University on an intercollegiate basis. The course had been introduced
two years previously, the first of its kind within the realm. Originally it
was offered by a team of three, regrettably all now deceased: Edward
Johnson, Ivo Lapenna, and Albert K. R Kiralfy. I had come to
England to replace the late Edward Johnson, whose untimely death
had left vacant the Readership in Soviet Law, tenable at University
College London. He had, I believe, been instrumental in introducing
the Soviet Law course, having in 1967 launched a series of evening lec
tures on the subject which were open to the public, were well at
tended, and resulted in the book that appeared posthumously.1
With my arrival, Albert Kiralfy decided to step out of the course
and leave it to be taught by Lapenna and myself, which we duly did for
the next seventeen years. It soon became clear that we shared a fun
damentally different perception of the nature of the structure of both
the USSR and, within that entity, the Russian Soviet Federated
Socialist Republic ("RSFSR"). Having discovered the differences, we
developed a "horse and pony" show over the years to introduce stu
dents to what we considered the core issues to be. And great fun it
was.
I was away on sabbatical during the 1986-87 academic year, so I
never learned Lapenna's latest views on perestroika and its implica* Professor of Comparative Law, University of London; Director; The Vinogradoff In
stitute, University College London; Professor of International and Comparative Law, Mos
cow Higher School of Social and Economic Sciences; Academician, National Academy of
Sciences of Ukraine and Russian Academy of Natural Sciences. M.A. 1963, Johns Hopkins;
J.D. 1966, Harvard; LL.M. 1997, Academy University of Law, Russian Academy of Sciences;
Ph.D. 1970, Johns Hopkins; LL.D. 1979, University of London. Member, District of Colum
bia Bar and Bar of the Supreme Court of the United States. - Ed.

1. E. JOHNSON, INTRODUCTION TO SOVIET LAW (1969).
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tions for constitutional law. When we last had the opportunity to per
form together in autumn 1985, no changes were in evidence. The es
sence of Lapenna's perception therefore will not, I think, have
changed. In his view the Soviet Union as a whole, and the RSFSR as a
constituent union republic of the USSR, were thoroughly "federal
ized." In substance the USSR was a unitary state clothed in "federal"
dress. The trappings of statehood for the fifteen union republics, and a
fortiori for lesser administrative-territorial entities, were nothing more
than a symbolic genuflection in the direction of structures that served,
and should serve, ideological purposes against the particular back
ground of Russian history. The Soviet Union in this respect was a tri
umph of substance over form, and that was all that truly mattered.
Without necessarily quarreling with the perception of substance,
which I pointed out did vary over the course of time, I emphasized the
importance of form. The Treaty of the Union of 30 December 1922 which formed the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics - was a docu
ment of international law concluded, initially, by four independent
states. Labels are not easy. here, but to me, on the spectrum of "con
federation - federation - federal," it was closer to the confederation
but supple enough to incorporate strong dosages of federation and
federal models. Lawyers tend to focus upon the formal mechanisms of
federalism: rights of secession, applicable law, remedies, attributes of
statehood, and so on. Lapenna dismissed the treaty and constitutional
rights of secession by the union republics as "paper" rights, unrealiz
able in practice . without civil war. To me they were "sleeping dog"
provisions, unrealizable at the time, but who could say what their fu
ture role might be.
Looking back over the past decade, "form" proved to have been of
exceptional, if not decisive, importance in shaping the dismantling of
the Soviet Union, and form continues to be a central concern in re
shaping the structure of the Rµssian Federation. Those who viewed
the Soviet Union as irretrievably unitary or federal in substance will
quite naturally have expected any disintegration of that structure in all
likelihood to have been accompanied qy widespread violence and civil
strife. That disintegration should have proceeded in accordance with
the international law of treaties some find as implausible as the peace
ful turning over of Hong Kong back to China once the lease and treaty
schemes had lapsed there.
Be that as it may, "federationism" - to use the term I preferred in
my own study of Russian law2 - in the Russian Federation has taken
new directions to address old problems. Dr. Jeffrey Kahn's3 admirable
and . thoroughly researched study offers invaluable materials and in2.

See W. E.

BUTLER, RUSSIAN LAW 274 (1999).

3. Jeffrey Kahn is a graduate of St. Anthony's College, Oxford University (D.Phil.) and
the University of Michigan Law School.
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sights on what has been transpiring in the world of Russian federalism
(and beyond) from the earliest Soviet days to the present, with par
ticular emphasis and depth on the post-Soviet decade.
Kahn's study is a revised version of a D.Phil. thesis completed at
Oxford University, and to a certain extent, but not disruptively, it be
trays its dissertation origins. As for the Butler/Lapenna dialogue, he
would have been strongly pro-Lapenna, although he creates as his
nemesis Professor William H. Riker,4 whose classic study of federalism
serves as the foil for many of Kahn's observations and conclusions.
Kahn makes his position absolutely clear from the outset:
It has frequently been asserted, first, that federal government is possible
in a non-democratic regime, and second, that this holds true even when
fundamental legal principles are absent. The Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics is cited as the classic example of such a state structure. I dis
pute the validity of these theoretical and empirical assertions . . . the So
viet Union was a federal facade that hardly masked the most centralized
state in modern history. (p. 1)

He rightly observes that this "facade" had "tremendous repercus
sions" for the development of post-Soviet Russian federalism, itself a
multinational species of federationism built upon the "crumbling
foundations" of the former Soviet Union. And he rightly observes
with some wonderment that "a new state was built almost overnight in
both the real and ideological rubble of the ancien regime" (p. 1).
In my view, of course, there should be no wonderment, for such is
the beauty of "legal form," moribund or not, that the disappearance of
one level of state structure founded formally upon international legal
concepts leaves a residual vessel into which the new federationism
pours relatively readily. This is not to suggest that the Russian
Federation is nothing more than a USSR at a new level; it most em
phatically is not, and Kahn's study is the best known to me that over
whelmingly and scrupulously makes that plain.
But I find Kahn's assault upon Riker5 unpersuasive because, for
different reasons, I find Riker, as expounded by Kahn, unconvincing.
The difficulty seems to me to lie with American political science gen
erally: its "Americanization" of the concept of what is federal and
what is not, and its "romanticism" about the putative relationship
among "federalism," democracy, and the rule of law. Terminology
may be partly, or mostly, at the root of the issue.
American terminology concentrates upon the word "federal" and
"federalism." Kahn says that. "federalism is a broad church, and 'fed4. See

WILLIAM H. RIKER, FEDERALISM: ORIGIN, OPERATION, SIGNIFICANCE (1964).

5. "In a departure from the classic exposition of federal theory by William Riker, I dis
pute the assertion that federalism is possible in an authoritarian environment. The immedi
ate implication of this approach is the rejection of the surprisingly unchallenged view of the
Soviet Union as an authoritarian, yet nevertheless federal, system of government." P. 2.
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eral' can describe a wide continuum of institutional arrangements"
(p. 2). But that is just the point. "Federal" is not in reality a broad
church; it is a narrow church at one end of the "federationist" contin
uum or spectrum. I used the word "federationism" in my study of
Russian law precisely because in my view the expression "federal"
would have been inappropriate and misleading. I would here go fur
ther to suggest that we need to apply and, if necessary, invent a range
of terminology to cope more accurately with the finer distinctions of
the federative syndrome. .
Working just with the Russian language for the moment (others
must be brought into the equation), it is simply wrong in my view to
translate "federativnyi" and "federal'nyi" as synonyms (which Kahn
does not necessarily do, although the substance of his argument con
flates the concepts). But that is only the beginning. There is "federal
izm" (federalism), "federalizatsiia" (federalization), "defederalizat
siia" (defederalization), "federirovanie" (whose translation needs
thoughtful consideration) and "federationism" - all of which have
subspecies, such as, state federalism, financial federalism, budgetary
federalism, and so on.6 Is the United States of America a "federal"
system? Absolutely. Is it a federation, or a federated system? Not
really - at least not since the Civil War. Is the Russian Federation a
"federal" system? No, but it is a "federative" or "federated" system,
and it has a "federal" government.
Insofar as federalism is by definition linked with the "requirements
of democracy and the rule of law," depending upon how these are de
fined, we move away from considerations of structure and balances of
power to more subjective characterizations. Federationism is certainly
possible in an authoritarian environment, and both the former Soviet
Union and the present Russian Federation are examples, given that
authoritarianism also operates on a spectrum of degree. All states are
authoritarian to some extent in some of their public's eyes. But surely
to pursue the proposition; one must be able to distinguish terminologi
cally among the species or types of federative schemes which exist and
which existed in the past.
As for the requirements of democracy and the rule of law vis-a-vis
federalism, l am not confident as to precisely what these are. Kahn is
content to define them by using concepts of political science. Democ
racy, for example, is defined on a working basis by invoking R.A.
Dahl's7 institutional guarantees for democracy and elaborating them.
The rule of law is defined by recourse to Elster's distinction between

6. See FEDERALIZM: TEORIIA, INSTITUTY, OTNOSHENIIA (SRAVNITEL'NO-PRAVOVOE
ISSLEDOVANIE) (FEDERALISM. THEORY, INSTITUTES, RELATIONS (COMPARATIVE LAW
STUDY)] 11-44 (B. N. Topomin ed., 2001).

7. R. A. DAHL, POLYARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION (1971).
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the rule of law and the principle of legality.8 They both serve Kahn
well in his approach, and he intelligently and persuasively extends
their application to Russia insofar as they may be applicable.
Yet here, too, is an excessive "Americanization" of the conceptual
apparatus. Elster's proposition that the rule of law means the "pro
spective principles that laws be stable and predictable" (p. 25 n.23) ob
scures one of the most fascinating and meaningful debates in Russian
legal thought, a debate whose outcome is far from assured. Elster
would not, nor would nearly all Anglo-American political scientists or
jurists, think to distinguish between the concepts of law routinely ex
pressed in European tongues but not in the English language: the dis
tinction between jus and lex (Latin), droit and Loi (French), recht and
gesetz (German) and pravo and zakon (Russian). The core of the de
bate in Russian jurisprudence at the moment with regard to the rule of
law is, "which law?": pravo or zakon? Adherence to zakon, or lex that is, man-made statutory law - is normally a principle recognized
in authoritarian and democratic states alike. Andrei Vyshinskii, the
lead prosecutor in the Stalinist show trials, called in the mid-1930s for
a return to "stability of laws" (stabil'nost' zakonov ), a perfectly re
spectable principle of positivism. President Putin's much debated plea
for the dictatorship of a law (diktatura zakona) may be understood in
the same way, or may be construed as a reference to legality, that is,
compliance with legislation. Depending upon context it is merely a
plea to be more law-abiding, for a reduction of criminality, for compli
ance within a federated system of federal law on the part of the sub
jects of the Russian Federation, and so on.
Many Russian jurists equate jus and lex, pravo and zakon. The last
is a mirror image of the first. Others insist upon their being distin
guished: pravo is the totality of law, not merely man-made legislation,
and zakon must conform to pravo or be deemed illegal. For propo
nents of pravo a key issue is its source - divine law, customary law,
natural law, or others. It will be obvious that the human rights clauses
of the 1993 Russian Constitution have an origin in something other
than zakon; they must have, if those rights are to be considered inal
ienable, as the Constitution provides.9
Kahn is well aware of the issue, though (pp. 53-56), and he distin
guishes between "Law" and "law" to make his point effectively in
English. Whether AV. Dicey should be read to support a linkage be
tween the rule of law and federalism, l have some doubts. Dicey be
lieved that federalism meant "legalism - the predominance of the ju
diciary in the constitution - the prevalence of a spirit of legality
among the people" (pp. 54-55). This, coming from a jurist whose coun8. CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY (J. Elster & R. Slagstad eds., 1988).
9. See BUTLER, supra note 2, at 84.
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try did not and does not have a constitution, may be read as the views
of a proponent of "lex" as much as "jus." Kahn, however, believes
Dicey has in mind Law, not law; that is, Dicey's "legalism" means
Law, whose core qualities are: "legitimacy, predictability, stability,
fairness, efficiency, and a repudiation of secrecy in promulgating laws
and regulations" (p. 55). Those are core qualities that President Putin
would associate with his expression "dictatorship of law" as a positiv
ist. Whether they are pravo, and whether Dicey in positivist England
saw them as Law, is open to doubt.
Around that issue turns the compatibility of federalism with both
democracy and authoritarianism. Since I understand federalism to be
a more centralized scheme, legally, formally, and actually than federa
tionism, which is a looser relationship that invokes statehood and sov
ereignty to a greater degree than would be the case in a federal sys
tem, the rule of jus is more essential if a federation is to be truly
democratic and respect the elements of autonomy granted to subjects
of the Federation.
If, however, it were to be accepted that federalism cannot truly ex
ist without democracy and the rule of law, one must ask why there are
so few federated states in the world.. Here is where the implications of
"federal theory" become obscure. If Kahn is correct, is it the view that
the antithesis also is true: democracy and the rule of Law are inherent
attributes of true federalism, but without federalism democracy and
the rule of Law cannot exist? Surely world experience is otherwise.
Kahn observes that "federalism appeals to states struggling with vari
ous forms of internal disharmony, but which nonetheless value diver
sity within a more unitary framework . . . . There is seldom a single
motivation; a variety of factors often intermingle and co-determine the
prospects for federalism" (p. 61). That would seem to be as prescient
an observation as possible.
From "federal theory," or what I would prefer to call "theories of
federationism," the book moves on to a thorough and fascinating con
sideration of the legacy of Soviet "federalism," Gorbachev's "federal
ism problem," the process of federal transition, inter-governmental
relations under Yeltsin's new federalism, federal effects on transitions
in Russia's republics, and the federal reforms of President Putin.
These require six chapters in all, and I have not seen a better account,
or a more perceptive one, in any language. One may disagree with ob
servations in passing, or the emphasis placed, but overall the account
is assured and full of insights.10 Indeed, here is where the book comes
into its own, for the author has conducted extensive interviews with
the architects of federationism at all levels in Russia, explored the na
tional and regional press and national, regional, and local legislation,
10. One useful account which eluded the author is

z.

tions ofRussian Federalism, IV SUDEBNIK 823-68 (1999).

Douglas, Constitutional Founda
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judicial practice, and the Western literature on federalism ---, all scru
pulously recorded in an excellent bibliography.
And here too is where, to borrow one of Kahn's favorite terms, an
"asymmetry" exists. One of the many strengths of the study is Kahn's
account and assessment ofWestern federalism theories and Soviet and
Russian practice. Missing is an examination of post-Soviet Russian
doctrines on federalism. The literature is considerable, because the
debate has been active, continuous, and interdisciplinary. To venture a
purely impressionistic judgment, the Russian literature on federation
ism has become more interesting and perceptive than its foreign coun
terpart simply because Russian federationism is still in the making and
Russian scholars have either a ringside seat or a participatory role.11
Perhaps the disposition of social scientists and lawyers to "classify"
causes us to overlook the wheat for the chaff. The Russian Federation
did indeed inherit a Soviet-structured species of federation, and the
early debate naturally resounded on how much of that structure to re
tain and what changes should be introduced. Concepts such as "sover
eignty," "statehood," "nationhood" - associated more with public in
ternational law and independent statehood than with constitutional
law and federationism - were bandied about, as Kahn demonstrates,
in the most remarkable and inconsistent ways by individuals who had
little appreciation, perhaps, of their full implications. But that is pre
cisely the point. This has been quite properly a Russian dialogue, and
the formal trappings of federationism as measured by continuity in the
stature of territorial-administrative entities, boundaries, state struc
tures, and the like remain greatly indebted to the Soviet era. Alloca
tions of jurisdiction have, of course, redounded to the side of the sub
jects of the Federation. Although the central government seems
determined to claw back some of what was conceded, and at the mo
ment is succeeding, this will always be in Russia a sphere of shifting
gravities as part of the political process. And so it should be.
Parts of the story might have received greater attention from Kahn
in their legal dimension. The treaties between the central government
and the subjects of the Federation, more than 800, are a story far from
fully told, yet they seem in a difficult transition era to have played a
constructive lubricant role in enabling central-periphery relations to
achieve a proper balance. Their uncertain legal status may have intro
duced elements of flexibility during an era when lines drawn sharply in
the sand could have provoked more serious conflicts than they did. A
particularly attractive feature of the book are the occasional excur11. See, e.g., FEDERALIZM I REGIONAL'NAIA POLmKA v POLIETNICHNYKH
GOSUDARSTVAKH [FEDERALISM AND REGIONAL POLICY IN POLY-ETHNIC STATES) (R.N.
lsmagilova & V.R Filippov eds., 2001); 0SNOVY NATSIONAL'NYKH I FEDERATIVNYKH
OTNOSHENII [FOUNDATIONS OF NATIONALITY AND FEDERATIVE RELATIONS) (R. G. Ab
dulatipov ed., 2001).
.
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suses into individual case studies - Bashkortostan, Kalmykia, and
others - to examine individual leadership, election, or other issues.
Comparative tables inform the reader, although sometimes they suffer
from unsatisfactory translations of legal texts.12
In his Conclusion, Kahn quotes William Riker to the effect that
"an initial difficulty in any discussion of federalism is that the meaning
of the word has been thoroughly confused by dramatic changes in the
institutions to which it refers" (p. 279). Riker is quite wrong. It is not
the meaning of the word that has been confused; it is the inadequacy
of the terminology generally to keep apace of and satisfactorily to de
scribe the multiple variants of federationism. Small wonder that politi
cal elites in Russia confront conflicting conceptions of what exactly it
means to be federal. It is not for the Russians to fit themselves into
any preexisting procrustean bed of federalism; it is for them to fashion
their own destiny within a species of federationism that they find con
genial and suitable to their circumstances. Other conceptions of fed
erationism may inform some of their choices, as will their own history.
Whether Russia meets or will meet some ideal type of federationism is
irrelevant; more important is whether she conforms to democratic and
rule-of-pravo values and standards consistent with her own standards
and those of international law.
Kahn offers sensible advice in observing that a "culture of legality"
should be created, to which I would add a culture that is consistent
with the rule of Law. He observes· that if the federation is to survive,
consensus must be achieved to assert j urisdiction over individual issues
and the level of the state that should be engaged, and that a sense of
legal constraint must operate. Whether unilateral declarations of sov
ereignty should give way, however, is to my mind more doubtful. They
and the political philosophy underlying them are the safety valve of
form should the Russian Federation at some point veer backward to
ward the Soviet substance of federalism. Here the ground is more un
certain, for many political communities in the Russian Federation are
manifestly not sovereign and will not be recognized as such in the
world as we know it. The Russian Federation is not a treaty-based
federation in the sense that the USSR was, and the treaties of the fed
eration are not widely accepted, if at all, as documents of international
law either by most of the parties thereto or by the international com
munity. But the Russian Federation is officially named a federation
(which the USSR never was), and during the Soviet era it was named a
"federated" or "federative" republic.
In reading Kahn's account of especially the past decade, one is
struck by how rapidly everything has proceeded within the context of
federationism - from a state which played the lead role in disman12. In Table 6.5, the passage from the 1994 Udmurtia Constitution is legally unintelligi
ble, and many of the others contain internal inconsistencies or infelicities.
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tling another state, to a fragile political climate in which burgeoning
sovereignties could have led to self-destruction of the country, to a
melange of schemes for "papering over the cracks," to a considerable
tug-of-war between the center and the periphery that initially, in the
form of treaties, went very far in favor of the periphery, to the present
era in which the center is, through a combination of presidential and
judicial authority, taking back some of what was conceded previously.13
The saga is not over; it has barely commenced. Kahn's study is the
best and most thoughtful account available of the early experience.
·

·

13. A senior member of the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation
involved in renegotiating the basic treaties between the Federal Government and the sub
jects of the Russian Federation observed, in an interview with the present writer in July
2002, that the Russian Government intends to dissolve all these treaties by agreement with
the subject of the Russian Federation concerned. Thirty-two treaties have been terminated
by consent during the past year and another ten are in the process of either termination or
renegotiation. In the view of the Federal Government, these treaties create unacceptable
exceptions to the 1993 Russian Constitution and an unequal legal regime amongst the sub
jects of the Russian Federation. Some treaties may come to be replaced by "agreements"
which implement particular federal policies or programs in the regions without establishing
unconstitutional privileges or concessions for individual regions.

